persistent attempt to force General Greene to a decisive battle[1] in February and March, 1781, no serious and well sustained effort was ever made, during that protracted war, to destroy the American armies.

There can be little question that a precisely opposite policy would have been far more effectual.

In the case of the late war, moreover, there was less excuse for adopting McClelland plan; for the Southern Confederacy was not confined, as was the territory of the thirteen colonies, to the immediate vicinity of the Atlantic Ocean, and it was impossible even for General McClellan entirely to overlook the fact of the great importance of the Mississippi Valley. As to operations in this region, however, he does not speak with any defmiteness in this Memo* raudum of August 4th, 1861. He simply says that lie presumes that the force for the movement down the Mississippi will be determined by its commander and the President. But it is evident that he considers this as a subsidiary operation. It is true that at this time McClellan was not in command of all the armies, and it was certainly not incumbent on him to do more than to set forth what he thought ought to be the strength, composition and task of the army which he had been called upon

to com-
mand. But it is plain enough that he considers that
the movement along the Atlantic coast should be
the principal, operation of the war.

[1] The battle, when it was fought, on March 15, 1781, at Guilford Court-House, although a tactical success for the British, was attended by such a heavy loss of men that Lord Cornwallis was obliged to retire to Wilmington, N. C. He undoubtedly expected a complete victory, such as he had won over Gates at Camden in the preceding August.